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Supplementary Materials for “Intergovernmental Politics of Fiscal Balance in a Federal 
Democracy: The Experience of Brazil, 1996-2005”   
Endnote 14, Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   N Mean  S.d.       Min  Max 
Spending   270 82.22  11.35  27.99  114.21 
Diff. in Deputies  270 -0.44     0.23       -1.13   0.38       
Important Reforms  270 0.03      0.02           0     0.07 
Deputies* reforms 270 -0.016     0.01    -0.07     0.003 
Diff. in Deputies 2 270 -0.27     0.31       -1.13   0.38       
Deputies2* reforms 270 -0.01     0.01    -0.07     0.02 
Pork   270 0.33  0.04  0.27  0.39 
Deputies* pork 270 -0.15  0.08  -0.39  0.12 
Competitiveness  270 8.83  7.24  0.20  30.70 
PT    270 0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00 
Election   270 0.20  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Fiscal Resp. Law  270  0.50         0.50         0.00         1.00 
Incumbent Party  270 0.63         0.48         0.00         1.00 
Transfer   270  37.76        20.98         2.79        89.67 
Revenue (in mil.) 270 2.22      3.81     0.15     38.69 
GDP per capita  270  22.55        20.81         7.18       244.28 
Logged Population  270 15.11         1.11        12.56        17.52 
Lagged Spending  270  -0.17        0.12        -0.72         0.15 
Lagged Transfer 270 37.61        21.15         2.79        89.67 
Trend    270 5.50         2.88         1.00        10.00 
97 Reforms   270 0.80         0.40         0.00         1.00 
Lula    270 0.30         0.46         0.00         1.00 
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Endnote 15, Capital and Total Spending  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Capital Total  
   
Important Reforms 190.6981* -13.46 
 (102.946) (100.215) 
Difference in Deputies -6.6733 4.16 
 (6.501) (6.420) 
Deputies* reforms 210.3419 -176.12 
 (204.378) (205.221) 
Competitiveness -0.0325 -0.22*** 
 (0.105) (0.080) 
PT 0.3203 3.14 
 (2.571) (1.886) 
Election 7.0914*** 2.55 
 (1.715) (1.820) 
Fiscal Responsibility Law -1.5910 4.86*** 
 (1.525) (1.673) 
Incumbent Party 1.0748 0.06 
 (0.997) (1.144) 
Transfer -0.2715*** 0.31** 
 (0.088) (0.121) 
Revenue 1.9770*** -1.27 
 (0.255) (0.952) 
GDP per capita -0.0813 -0.46*** 
 (0.123) (0.150) 
Logged Population -8.4602 -46.64*** 
 (12.001) (14.822) 
Lagged Dependent Var. 0.1158 -11.97 
 (0.086) (7.218) 
Constant 143.3726 698.45*** 
 (158.119) (193.762) 
   
Observations 270 270 
R-squared 0.616 0.297 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Endnote 17, Random Effects Model  
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    7.3430558
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     7.521375   18.16985     0.41   0.679    -28.09088    43.13363
   lagdefrev     32.90155   5.311187     6.19   0.000     22.49181    43.31128
      logpop     4.940425   1.087854     4.54   0.000      2.80827    7.072581
   gdppercap     .1183077   .0333289     3.55   0.000     .0529843    .1836311
   adjrevmil    -1.049384   .2125529    -4.94   0.000    -1.465981   -.6327884
transshare~c     .1008572   .0486882     2.07   0.038     .0054301    .1962843
    govparty     .1883185   1.300478     0.14   0.885    -2.360572    2.737209
       frlaw     4.897655    1.51638     3.23   0.001     1.925604    7.869706
    election    -.6507439    1.79864    -0.36   0.718    -4.176015    2.874527
          pt     4.512164   2.145437     2.10   0.035     .3071857    8.717143
   abscomp50     -.023656   .0846592    -0.28   0.780     -.189585    .1422731
impbilldep~f    -273.6427   166.2426    -1.65   0.100    -599.4722    52.18694
depnatgovdif     6.216051   6.227007     1.00   0.318    -5.988657    18.42076
 impbillsper     -83.6248   85.72252    -0.98   0.329    -251.6378    84.38825
                                                                              
spendshare~c        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(13)      =    111.08
       overall = 0.3026                                        max =        10
       between = 0.5322                                        avg =      10.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2103                         Obs per group: min =        10
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =        27
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       270
> l gdppercap logpop lagdefrev, re
. xtreg spendshareperc impbillsper depnatgovdif impbilldepnatgovdif abscomp50 pt election frlaw govparty transshareperc adjrevmi
 
Please note the “sigma_u=0” above.  
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Important Reforms -17.81 
 (73.133) 
Difference in Deputies 4.69 
 (5.185) 








Fiscal Responsibility Law 0.01 
 (1.994) 






GDP per capita 0.06 
 (0.097) 
Logged Population 5.11 
 (9.646) 




Fixed effects yes 
Observations 243 
R-squared 0.034 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Endnote 19, Robustness to the use of alternative standard errors   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Important Reforms -166.51** -166.51** -166.51** -166.51*** 
 (71.856) (68.288) (69.353) (64.624) 
Difference in Deputies 9.48* 9.48** 9.48* 9.48** 
 (4.728) (4.341) (5.011) (4.200) 
Deputies* reforms -354.51*** -354.51*** -354.51*** -354.51*** 
 (127.316) (125.471) (134.528) (111.960) 
Competitiveness -0.16* -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** 
 (0.091) (0.077) (0.071) (0.065) 
PT 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.14 
 (2.331) (2.318) (2.225) (1.660) 
Election -3.75*** -3.75*** -3.75*** -3.75** 
 (1.274) (1.421) (1.407) (1.484) 
Fiscal Responsibility Law 7.15*** 7.15*** 7.15*** 7.15*** 
 (1.807) (1.665) (1.639) (1.999) 
Incumbent Party -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 
 (0.830) (1.061) (1.092) (0.823) 
Transfer 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 
 (0.142) (0.102) (0.085) (0.080) 
Revenue -3.27*** -3.27*** -3.27*** -3.27*** 
 (0.870) (0.712) (0.328) (0.330) 
GDP per capita -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
 (0.089) (0.100) (0.121) (0.121) 
Logged Population -31.96*** -31.96*** -31.96*** -31.96*** 
 (8.773) (9.671) (11.720) (11.775) 
Lagged Spending 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 
 (5.479) (5.165) (4.892) (7.811) 
Constant 469.65*** 469.65*** 561.84*** 469.65*** 
 (109.953) (126.111) (178.125) (155.113) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
R-squared 0.642 0.642 0.486 0.642 
Number of states 27 27 27 27 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Please note that column 1 is identical to column 2 of Table 1 in the article. It is included here 
to make the comparison easier.   
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Endnote 21, Difference in the number of deputies from the governor’s party and the presidential 
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Important Reforms -175.17** 
 (68.042) 
Difference in Deputies 2 10.05** 
 (4.463) 








Fiscal Responsibility Law 7.23*** 
 (1.791) 






GDP per capita -0.31*** 
 (0.090) 
Logged Population -31.71*** 
 (8.854) 




Fixed effects yes 
Observations 270 
R-squared 0.640 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 




















0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Number of reforms
Coefficient of difference in deputies Upper boundary at 95 % 
Lower boundary at 95 % 









0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Number of reforms
Coefficient of difference in deputies Upper boundary at 95 % 
Lower boundary at 95 % 
Effect of difference in deputies for different number of reforms
 
Upper (lower) graph estimated from the model in column 3 (4) in Table 1.
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Important Reforms -160.23* 
 (78.707) 
Difference in Deputies 12.65** 
 (5.113) 








Fiscal Responsibility Law 6.72*** 
 (2.221) 




GDP per capita -0.15 
 (0.106) 
Logged Population -16.61 
 (10.198) 







Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
